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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-year-old Matthew Allen McKnight pleaded 
guilty to felony possession of a stolen vehicle, and to felony grand theft in separate 
cases. Mr. McKnight subsequently filed motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in both 
cases, which the district court denied. The district court, in each case, imposed a 
concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. 
In this consolidated appeal, Mr. McKnight asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Coeur d'Alene Police Department officers responded to a report of a suspicious, 
wanted male. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1 One of the officers saw a 
male ducking into a gray Toyota Camry parked on the street. (PSI, p.3.) The male was 
identified as the wanted male, Mr. McKnight. (PSI, p.3.) The officers recognized that 
the plates of the car, and the car itself, had both been reported stolen. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. McKnight's girlfriend Tanna Minegar, who had been sitting on a nearby porch, 
denied that the vehicle or plates had been stolen. (PSI, p.3.) She stated that she and 
Mr. McKnight were homeless and had been living out of the car. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. McKnight reportedly told the officers he had purchased the car for 
Ms. Minegar from someone in Spokane. (PSI, p.3.) He stated that he had a bill of sale 
and registration for the car in the glove compartment, but the officers were unable to 
find them and Mr. McKnight refused to consent to a wider search of the car. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. McKnight also told the officers that the asking price of $1500.00 for the car seemed 
1 
a good price, but the seller had all the I, p.3.) He 
that the stolen plates came from his friend "Chris," who had the car and 
returned it with plates. (PSI, p.3.) 
When the officers told Mr. McKnight that the car matched the description of one 
used in two recent robberies, he reportedly stated that he and Ms. Minegar had to be 
involved in the robbery because "Chris" had held a gun to their heads. (PSI, p.4.) The 
officers arrested Mr. McKnight and booked him for grand theft by possession of stolen 
property.2 (PSI, p.4.) 
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-17453 (hereinafter, the possession of a stolen 
vehicle State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. McKnight had 
committed the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle, felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 49-228. (No. 41538 R., pp.34-35.) After Mr. McKnight waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound him over to the district court. (No. 41538 
R., p.41.) He was released on his own recognizance. (No. 41538 R., p.41.) The State 
then filed an Information charging him with the above offense. (No. 41538 R., pp.44-
45.) Mr. McKnight entered a written not guilty plea to the charge. (No. 41538 R., pp.46-
47.) 
1 The PSI relates to both cases in this consolidated appeal. 
2 The officers reportedly found stolen financial transaction cards, bank account 
information, stolen wallets and identification cards, check blanks, and a printer with a 
check blank in the tray in the car and under the porch where Ms. Minegar had been 
seated. (PSI, p.4.) They also found a 2003 registration for the car, and a partially 
written bill of sale in a black notebook belonging to Ms. Minegar. (PSI, p.4.) The 
officers additionally found a white toy pistol, a baggie of Tramadol pills, a baggie of what 
appeared to be marijuana residue, and a baggie of methamphetamine residue. (PSI, 
p.4.) Further, they found sheets of paper with the names, birthdates, and Social 
Security numbers of nine individuals. (PSI, p.4.) 
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Coeur d'Alene police 
theft or unauthorized use of Idaho Child 
with 
debit 
Craycraft 
(PSI, told the 
officers that when she went to sleep a couple days prior to speaking with the officers, 
the card was inside her purse. (PSI, p.4.) At that time, Mr. McKnight was in her home 
because Ms. Minegar babysat Ms. Craycraft's children. (PSI, p.4.) Later that day, 
Ms. Craycraft's male roommate discovered several items missing from his room. (PSI, 
p.4.) The next day, Ms. Craycraft confronted Mr. McKnight about the stolen items and 
kicked him out of the residence after he returned the items. (See PSI, p.4.) When 
Ms. Craycraft checked the balance of her card, she discovered that there was no money 
left in the account even though child support had been deposited. , p.4.) She 
also found that the card had been used several times at a store and the store's ATM in 
the early morning hours, even though the card was still in her purse. (PSI, p.4.) A total 
of $316.17 had been withdrawn. (PSI, p.4.) 
Ms. Craycraft suspected that Mr. McKnight had used the card and then returned 
it to the purse. (PSI, p.4.) She reported that he would have known her PIN because 
she had let him use her food stamp card, and both cards had the same PIN. (PSI, p.4.) 
Ms. Craycraft also described the clothing Mr. McKnight had been wearing that day. 
(PSI, p.4.) Video surveillance from the store showed that a male wearing the described 
clothing had used the card at the store and ATM. (See PSI, p.4.) The clerk picked 
Mr. McKnight out of a photo line-up and stated that he had purchased multiple scratch 
tickets. (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. McKnight initially denied responsibility for the missing card, but after being 
confronted with the evidence, he reportedly stated that did not remember taking the 
card and that he might have been intoxicated at the time. (PSI, p.4.) When confronted 
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with having the to and use the card and then return it the 
he told him put the card back after she found it in his 
pocket. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. McKnight was then arrested for grand theft and burglary. (PSI, 
p.4.) He admitted to being out on his own recognizance for other theft-related charges. 
(PSI, p.4.) 
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-19904 (hereinafter, the grand theft case), the 
State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. McKnight had committed the crime of 
grand theft, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1)(b). (No. 41537 
R., pp.19-20.) After Mr. McKnight waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate bound him over to the district court. (No. 41537 R., p.27.) Mr. McKnight 
entered a written not guilty plea to the charge. (No. 41537 R., pp.31-33.) The State 
subsequently filed an Information charging him with felony grand theft, in violation of 
1.C. § 18-2403(1 ). (No. 41537 R., pp.34-35.) 
Mr. McKnight later entered into a plea agreement with the State, and agreed to 
plead guilty in the possession of a stolen vehicle case and in the grand theft case. (No. 
41537 R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) Mr. McKnight also agreed to waive his right to 
appeal the conviction and sentence. (No. 41537 R., pp.36, 39; No. 41538 R., pp.49, 
52.) The State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence, a period of supervised 
probation with local jail time, and a drug court screening if requested. (No. 41537 
R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) The State also agreed to not file a possession of 
methamphetamine charge in the possession of a stolen vehicle case, or a burglary 
charge in the grand theft case. (No. 41537 R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) 
The district court accepted Mr. McKnight's guilty pleas in both cases. (No. 41537 
R., p.36; No. 41538 R., p.49.) The district court also ordered Mr. McKnight to undergo a 
4 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. (No. 41537 No. 
1 ) McKnight was then on his own in the 
grand theft case. (No. 41537 R., p.37; No. 41538 R., p.50.) However, Mr. McKnight did 
not appear at his scheduled sentencing hearing for both cases. ( See No. 41537 
R., p.46; No. 41538 R., p.58.) Additionally, Mr. McKnight did not attend his Section 19-
2524 mental health evaluation. (PSI, p.49.) 
After being taken into custody, Mr. McKnight filed Motions to Withdraw Plea in 
both cases. (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62; see No. 41537 R., p.47; 
No. 41538 R., p.59.) The motions were made "on the grounds that the Defendant has 
mental t1ealth issues and did not fully understand the consequences of the plea." (No. 
41537 R., p.49; No. 41538 R., p.61.) Further, "Counsel for the Defendant has a difficult 
time understanding the Defendant's communications and receiving Defendant's 
assistance in his own defense." (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.) 
Thus, the motions stated that Mr. McKnight "needs to obtain a mental health evaluation, 
follow the proscribed recommendation of the evaluator, including any medication 
[regimen], and then proceed with this matter." (No. 41537 R., p.50; No. 41538 R., p.62.) 
Mr. McKnight also filed motions in both cases requesting that the district court 
order an I.C. § 18-211 examination. (No. 41537 R., pp.51-52; No. 41538 R., pp.63-64.) 
The State agreed and stipulated to those motions, and the district court ordered a 
Section 18-211 examination. (No. 41537 R., pp.53-56; No. 41538 R., pp.65-68.) The 
district court kept the motions to withdraw plea "in abeyance." (No. 41537 R., p.53; No. 
41538 R., p.65.) The Section 18-211 evaluation found that Mr. McKnight was 
competent to stand trial and fit to proceed. (PSI, pp.41-48.) 
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At the subsequent hearing on motions to raw Mr. McKnight's guilty 
in both cases, McKnight's explained that I.C. § 1 1"1 
supplied the rationale for withdrawing the guilty pleas: 
If you look at page 5 of the psych eval at the bottom, the last paragraph 
there, it has the psychotic disorder. And it says, "Mr. McKnight does not 
currently meet the criteria for psychotic disorder, but he may have met the 
criteria for this diagnosis in the past." And that's what I'm talking about is 
in the past. And it said, "For this reason consideration should be given to 
diagnosis for substance-induced psychotic disorder." And I think that's 
what he was going through when I met with him months ago and at the 
time that he entered the pleas in this matter. 
He's been in custody for quite some time now, and I think he's had 
the opportunity to - to detox further. And so - and I don't think he's really 
currently experiencing this, but I think at the time he was. And then 
had an opportunity, he pied guilty, that he could get O.R.'ed, and I think 
that's kind of what pushed him over the edge on - "Okay. I'll do it. I'll 
plead." But now that his head is cleared, he wanted me to file this motion 
to withdraw his plea. 
(Tr., p.22, L.11 - p.23, L.5; see PSI, p.45.) 
The State argued that good cause had not been demonstrated to allow 
Mr. McKnight to withdraw his guilty pleas, and Mr. McKnight's counsel's opining that 
Mr. McKnight may have had a diagnosis for a psychotic disorder was not evidence. 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.15-25.) The State also noted that the motions to withdraw the guilty pleas 
had been filed after the preparation of the presentence report. 3 (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.) 
Additionally, the State argued that, "because [Mr. McKnight] has some 
subsequent law violations, because he failed to appear for sentencing, the plea 
agreement that was executed is no longer binding on the State." (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14.) 
The district court determined that the Section 18-211 evaluation indicated 
Mr. McKnight was competent when he entered the guilty pleas and that Mr. McKnight 
3 The PSI was filed on January 23, 2013. (PSI, p.1.) The motions to withdraw plea 
were filed on May 7, 2013. (No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.) 
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had not made the requisite increased showing of good cause to withdraw his pleas 
(considering the motions to withdraw plea had been filed after the preparation of the 
PSI), and thus denied the motions. (Tr., p.26, L.6- p.27, L.10.) 
However, immediately after the district court denied the motions to withdraw the 
guilty pleas, Mr. McKnight's counsel stated "for the record that Mr. McKnight had not 
seen the presentence report. He had left the area, and I couldn't get ahold of him. He 
wasn't even aware of the recommendation in the PSI." (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.) 
At the sentencing hearing for both cases, the State recommended that the district 
court impose a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. (No. 41537 R., p.67; 
No. 41538 R., p.79.) Mr. McKnight recommended that the district court impose a 
suspended unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, and place him on 
probation for a period of three years. (No. 41537 R., p.68; No. 41538 R., p.80.) 
Alternatively, Mr. McKnight recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction and 
place him on a "rider." (No. 41537 R., p.68; No. 41538 R., p.80.) The district court, in 
each case, imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. 
(No. 41537 R., p.68, 70-75; No. 41538 R., pp.80, 82-87.) 
In each case, Mr. McKnight filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment 
and Sentence. (No. 41537 R., pp.76-78; No. 41538 R., pp.88-90.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court later consolidated the appeals in both cases. (Nos. 41537 & 41538, Order 
Granting Motion to Consolidate, Dec. 2, 2013.) 
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ISSUE 
its discretion when it den motions to 
8 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McKnight's Motions To 
Withdraw His Guilty Pleas 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McKnight asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, because he showed a just reason to withdraw 
his pleas. Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw the guilty pleas because the 
pleas were involuntary. The guilty pleas were involuntary because his mental health 
issues left him unable to fully understand the consequences of the pleas. Further, 
permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would not have prejudiced the State. 
8. Standard Of Review And Applicable Laws 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs motions to withdraw a guilty plea. "The 
decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the 
district court, and such discretion should be liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 
219, 222 (2008). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "is 
limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id. 
"[W]hen the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a 
'just reason' to withdraw the plea." Id. (quoting I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 
799, 801 (1988)). However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the 
defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about 
the probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the 
defendant's apparent motive." Id. ( citing State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 64 7 (Ct. App. 
2004 )). A motion to withdraw plea will be denied if the State can show resulting 
9 
from the 
motion 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004 ). 
not prejudice the State, a motion to withdraw a 
even if 
denied if the defendant has not presented and supported a "plausible reason for 
withdrawal of the plea." State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 (Ct. App. 2003). 
A defendant shows a just reason to withdraw a guilty p!ea if the plea was 
involuntary. See State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008). "A 
threshold question is whether the plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made." State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). Relief must 
be granted if the plea is legally defective. Id. In other words, "[i]f a plea was not taken 
in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea 
be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then . . . 'just reason' will be 
established as a matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009). 
"However, a constitutional defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show ... a 'just 
reason."' Id. If the appellate court on review determines that the plea was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made, it then proceeds to determine whether any other "just 
reason" exists for withdrawal of the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959. 
A court determines whether a guilty plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly 
through a three-part inquiry involving: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; 
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). "On appeal, Idaho law requires that 
voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record 
as a whole." Id. 
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The District Court Did Not Exercise Sound Judicial Discretion When It Required 
An Increased Showing Of Good Cause 
a preliminary matter, Mr. McKnight submits that 
"sound judicial discretion," see Arthur, 145 Idaho at 
district court 
when it required an 
increased showing of good cause because of the timing of the motions to withdraw plea. 
Mr. McKnight was not subject to "an increased showing of good cause" (see Tr., p.26, 
Ls.22-23), because he had not learned of the content of the PSI. 
As discussed above, if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before 
sentencing but "after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI or has 
other information about the probable sentence, the district court may temper its 
liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at 
While the motions to withdraw plea were filed after the preparation of the PSI 
(see PSI, p.1; No. 41537 R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62), that does not establish 
that Mr. McKnight learned of the content of the PSI. Rather, Mr. McKnight's counsel 
indicated that "Mr. McKnight had not seen the presentence report. . . . He wasn't even 
aware of the recommendation in the PSI." (See Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.) Thus, the district 
court did not exercise sound judicial discretion when it required an increased showing of 
good cause because of the timing of the motions to withdraw plea. 
D. Mr. McKnight Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas Because The 
Pleas Were Involuntary 
Mr. McKnight asserts that he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas 
because the pleas were involuntary. The district court in this case determined that the 
requisite showing to withdraw the guilty pleas had not been made, because the 
I.C. § 18-211 evaluation's finding that Mr. McKnight was competent supported the 
conclusion that he was competent when he entered the pleas, the timing of the motions 
11 
to withdraw (filed the preparation of the report) required an 
showing McKnight that the State was no longer 
bound by the plea agreement thanks to his failure to attend his scheduled sentencing. 
(Tr., p.26, L.6- p.27, L.10.) 
Despite those considerations, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his 
pleas because the pleas were involuntary. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36. His 
pleas were involuntary because his mental health issues left him unable to fully 
understand the consequences of the pleas. See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484. 
Contrary to the district court's detE3rmination (see Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21 ), the 
§ 18-211 evaluation suggests that Mr. McKnight was not competent to the 
guilty pleas because his mental health issues left him unable to understand the 
consequences of pleading guilty. The Section 1 11 evaluation indicates that 
Mr. McKnight had mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas, by 
stating that "Mr. McKnight does not currently meet the criteria for psychotic disorder, but 
he may have met the criteria for this diagnosis in the past." (See PSI, p.45.) "For this 
reason, consideration should be given to diagnosis of Substance-Induced Psychotic 
Disorder." (PSI, p.45.) Additionally, with respect to a diagnosis of bipolar disorder or 
schizoaffective disorder, the Section 18-211 evaluation states that while "[t]here is some 
speculation that Mr. McKnight may have Schizoaffective Disorder or some of Bipolar 
Disorder ... I could not establish whether he meets the criteria for either in the past." 
(PSI, p.45.) However, the evaluation also states that "there is a keyed-up, hyperactive 
flavor in his presentation which suggests the possibility of a substance-induced disorder 
which should be ruled out." (PSI, p.45.) 
12 
At the motion hearing, Mr. McKnight's counsel told district 
court that he was experiencing a 
psychotic disorder when he met with Mr. McKnight and when Mr. McKnight entered the 
pleas. (See Tr., p.22, L.22 p.23, L.1.) When Mr. McKnight's counsel first met with 
Mr. McKnight, "He had just fairly recently been arrested. He had been using 
methamphetamine, I think, pretty regularly, [a]nd I was really having trouble 
communicating with him." (Tr., p.21, Ls.20-23.) Mr. McKnight "was taking really fast 
and mumbling and going this way and that way. I just couldn't really get[] him nailed 
down [on] what he wanted to do, going and forth and back and forth." (Tr., p.21, 
- p.22, L.2.) Similarly, the motions to withdraw the guilty pleas stated that 
"Counsel for the Defendant has a difficult time understanding the Defendant's 
communications and receiving Defendant's assistance in his own defense." (No. 41537 
R., pp.49-50; No. 41538 R., pp.61-62.) Mr. McKnight's counsel's observations echo the 
Section 18-211 evaluator's comments about Mr. McKnight's "keyed-up, hyperactive" 
presentation, which suggested "the possibility of a substance-induced disorder .... " 
(See PSI, p.45.) Thus, the Section 18-211 evaluation indicates that Mr. McKnight had 
mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas. 
Mr. McKnight's mental health issues at the time he entered the guilty pleas left 
him unable to understand the consequences of pleading guilty. With respect to 
Mr. McKnight's understanding of the situation at the time he entered the guilty pleas, 
Mr. McKnight's counsel stated, "And then [Mr. McKnight] had an opportunity, [if] he pied 
guilty, that he could get O.R.'ed, and I think that's kind of what pushed him over the 
edge on-'Okay. I'll do it, I'll plead."' (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.) He did that before "his 
head ... cleared." (See Tr., p.23, L.4.) Mr. McKnight's focus on getting released on his 
13 
own recognizance, while he was apparently failing to consider incarceration 
if entered the pleas, indicates that he was u u 
consequences of pleading guilty because of his mental health issues. 
the 
Dopp, 124 
Idaho at 484. Thus, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas 
because the pleas were involuntary. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36. 
E. Permitting Mr. McKnight To Withdraw His Pleas Would Not Have Prejudiced 
The State 
Mr. McKnight further asserts that permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea would 
not have prejudiced the State. If a defendant shows that a just reason exists for 
withdrawing the plea, the State "may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating 
that prejudice would result from withdrawal of the plea." Dopp, 124 Idaho 
Here, the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would result from withdrawal 
of Mr. McKnight's guilty pleas. (See Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.25, L.6.) Additionally, the district 
court did not conclude that permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw the pleas would 
prejudice the State. (See Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.27, L.10.) Rather, the district court only 
determined that Mr. Anderson had not shown that a just reason existed to withdraw his 
pleas. (Tr., p. 27, Ls.8-10.) Thus, permitting Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would 
not have prejudiced the State. 
Because Mr. McKnight's mental health issues left him unable to fully understand 
the consequences of the guilty pleas, his pleas were involuntary. Because his pleas 
were involuntary, Mr. McKnight showed a just reason to withdraw his pleas. Permitting 
Mr. McKnight to withdraw his pleas would not have prejudiced the State. Thus, the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. McKnight's motions to withdraw 
his guilty pleas. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. McKnight respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his judgments of conviction and remand his cases to the district court with direction to 
grant his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2014. 
P;J ~ ~ ~---
BEN P~ MCGREEVY ~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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